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Abstract
Our model consists of two groups. Group 1 holds political power and
Group 2 threatens this power. Group 1 decreases the probability of its up-
heaval by co-opting some agents from Group 2 into a more benign third
group. Improvements in the upheaval technology lead to fewer but better
co-optation o®ers. Increasing the size and/or the degree of fragmentation of
Group 2 has the opposite e®ect. If the co-opted group also threatens Group
1, co-optation transfers are reduced.Our model provides a new explanation
of why growth is a politically stabilizing force. The theory suggests that, in
post-Communist privatizations, unstable governments will give large ben-
e¯ts to a small number of bene¯ciaries while stable governments will give
small bene¯ts to a large group.
JEL Classi¯cation Numbers: D74, P26, D3.
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\Men must be either pampered or crushed"
Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, (1981, p. 37)
1 Introduction
Examples abound of situations in which one social group threatens to take
political power away from a second group. In nineteenth century Europe,
traditional elites in many countries were threatened with revolutions. In
Russia, this threat was eventually ful¯lled. In recent times, Communist
countries in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe faced a similar threat that
was eventually realized. In a ¯nal twist, many market-oriented regimes in
these countries have faced various reversal threats to their reformist policies
in the Post-Soviet era.
A common response of governments that face such threats is to co-opt
the potential opposition. Many of the privatization processes conducted in
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the 1990s can be viewed
as attempts to build an active constituency in favor of the transition from
central planning to the market. The Russian case would be a prime ex-
ample; see Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1995) and Shleifer and Treisman
(2000). The Russian government took the view that there already existed
a very strong interest group, represented by the traditional industrial and
agricultural power structure, in the country. Any economic program that
attempted to disenfranchise all of these stakeholders would be undermined
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by them. Therefore, the privatization process was designed to pass most
of the government's wealth to this coalition group.2 The idea was to co-opt
a subset of them explicitly and link the self interest of these members to
the marketization process. The strategy was successful in the sense that it
allowed the reform process to proceed. Shleifer and Treisman (2000) take
a close look at Russia's privatization program from a political perspective
and argue that \there are two ways that a stakeholder can be neutralized.
Either he must be expropriated of the stake that gives him leverage. or
he must be co-opted - persuaded not to exercise his power to obstruct.
... Co-optation (...) implies not dealing the stakeholders out of the game
but dealing them new cards. ....transforming stakeholders from opponents
to supporters of reform often requires the creation of rents by the govern-
ment that these stakeholders can be o®ered in exchange for their support."
(Shleifer and Treisman, 2000, p. 8 and 9). According to this analysis, there
was no alternative to the strategy of turning over signi¯cant property rights
to entrenched stakeholders. The model we develop is consistent with this
interpretation of Russian privatization.
Imperial Russia attempted similar co-optation policies, including Prime
Minister Stolypin's wager on the strong and sober campaign that tried to
give ambitious peasants a stake in the system Nove (1972). Lenin feared
greatly this policy, opining that \if this should continue for very long peri-
ods of time ... it might force us to renounce any agrarian program at all.
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" (Morehead, 1958, p.69). Obviously, these co-optative e®orts were not
su±cient to avoid a revolution.3
In the Soviet period, the whole system of Communist Party membership,
with its associated array of special privileges, was clearly aimed at co-opting
potential opposition. Indeed citizens of Communist countries held no real-
istic chances of rising to positions of authority in the system unless they
were party members. At the same time, the advantages of membership were
conditional on full loyalty and support for the regime (Voslensky, 1984).
The above situations are of a wrenching, even revolutionary, sort but
there are other types of upheavals that, while not favored by groups in
power, do not carry the same cataclysmic implications. These include what
are commonly called middle class or bourgeois revolutions in which a newly
enriched and empowered group carries out a more benign and progressive
reordering of society so that old elite groups lose their special privileges.
This scenario seems particularly relevant for contemporary Asia. Taiwan's
democratization ¯ts this pattern; many people are hoping for similar devel-
opments in countries like Indonesia, Singapore, and China. In these coun-
tries, the co-optation strategy may be viewed as a government policy that
allows people to grow rich through their own e®orts. Rather than sti°ing
entrepreneurial activity, this policy allows a middle class to develop that
might eventually challenge the political monopoly of the party in power,
albeit in a less disruptive way than an expropriative revolution.4
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This paper develops a single framework that captures the similarities in
their underlying incentive structures. After a review of related literature
in Section 2, we develop a model in which one social group, Group 1, holds
political power but is threatened by another group, Group 2 in Section 3.
With a probability that is increasing in the number of members in Group
2, there will be a major upheaval that will expropriate a substantial portion
of Group 1's wealth. To diminish the likelihood of such an outcome Group
1 co-opts some people from Group 2 by creating a new group, Group C,
that is newly empowered in the system and does not support revolutionary
measures. Entry into Group C yields the bene¯t of a co-optative transfer
but comes at the cost of giving up an option to bene¯t from a successful
upheaval. Therefore, the size of the co-optation transfer must satisfy an in-
centive compatibility constraint requiring that individuals will accept only
co-optation transfers that improve their welfare. Group 1 chooses the num-
ber of people to co-opt so as to maximize its own utility subject to this
incentive constraint.
Within the context of Russian privatization, Group 1 represents the re-
formist government and Group 2 represents the opposition, i.e., the tradi-
tional industrial and agricultural power structure. Group C consists of those
who bene¯ted from the privatization process. Many of these bene¯ciaries
are now among the richest people in Russia.
One novel feature of this model is that, when Group 1's optimization
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problem has an interior solution, unequal treatment of equals results. In
particular, although everyone in Group 2 is indistinguishable ex ante, ex
post some of them are treated well, i.e., they receive co-optation payments,
and some of them are crushed, i.e., all their taxable income is seized.
We have two di®erent parameters in the model, both of which com-
prise what we call the technology of upheaval. The ¯rst gives the fraction
of the total wealth of society that would be destroyed in the event of up-
heaval. Decreasing this parameter represents an improvement in upheaval
technology and leads Group 1 to co-opt fewer people at a higher price per
person. Improvements in upheaval technology involving a parameter that
governs the relationship between the number of unco-opted people in Group
2 and the probability of upheaval have similar e®ects. Taken together, these
results justify a seemingly paradoxical outcome. Societies in which the revo-
lutionary technology is weak, i.e., politically stable societies, generate large
co-optation programs when measured by the number of people co-opted,
although co-optation payments are low compared to those in unstable so-
cieties. These results also have an interesting interpretation in terms of
post-Communist privatization. Speci¯cally, they predict that countries like
Russia, in which the initial support for the reform process was narrow, will
give generous deals to a small group of insiders in order to consolidate the
continuance of reforms. On the other hand, countries like Poland and Hun-
gary with much wider bases of support for reform will spread the bene¯ts
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of privatization less generously but to a much wider group. The other cru-
cial parameter of the model is the relative size of Group 1. We show that
increasing the size of Group 1 relative to Group 2 leads to less co-optation
and higher co-optation transfers. We show that the net e®ect of those two
changes is that less total resources are expended on co-optation.
The baseline model assumes implicitly that recipients of co-optation of-
fers cannot co-ordinate a strategy for accepting or rejecting, i.e., the full
fragmentation case. In Section 4, we allow for co-ordinated rejections by
considering a variety of cases ranging from full ability to co-ordinate for
groups of any size, i.e., the no fragmentation case, to limited rejection abil-
ity for groups only up to a various sizes. In the no fragmentation case, either
every member of Group 2 is co-opted or nobody is co-opted. In other words,
when Group 2 is highly organized, Group 1 is not able to treat equals un-
equally. Another interesting feature is that Group 1 will create a co-opted
class that is as divided as possible, i.e., it follows a divide-and-rule strategy.
In Section 5, we extend the model to incorporate the possibility of a
di®erent type of upheaval driven by Group C. This could be viewed as a
middle class or bourgeois revolution that would have the e®ect of equalizing
income between Groups 1 and 2. Because of the additional option allowed
for Group C, co-optation transfers are now lower. The basic model has the
property that a society's wealth has no e®ect on Group 1's behavior and,
hence, on the upheaval probability. However, in Section 6, we show that,
8
when the equilibrium upheaval probability is decreasing in wealth, growth
is politically stabilizing.
Finally, in Section 7 , we extend our framework to allow for partial
co-optation and ¯nd that Group 1 will not avail itself of this option in
general. Rather than working the intensive margin and partially co-opting
a large number of people, anyone who is co-opted will be fully co-opted.
In Section 8, we conclude with some further comments on post-Communist
privatization and an agenda for the future.
2 Literature review
Machiavelli was perhaps the ¯rst to address the question of how to im-
plement major reforms despite the presence of opponents in The Prince
(Machiavelli, 1981). In the sociology literature, and in particular in the
theory of organizations, the co-optative process has been viewed as a mech-
anism of adjustment aimed at guaranteeing stability for an authority in the
face of a threat (Selznick, 1948, Collins, 1988). Our theory of co-optation
is linked with the political economy literature starting with Tullock (1971)
who investigates why people take the extreme risk of participating in rev-
olutionary movements rather than free riding on the activity of others. In
Buchanan and Faith (1987), a non-elite group uses secession instead of up-
heaval to constraint the elite's power. Grossman (1991) treats time spent
participating in an insurrectionary movement as an investment in an agent's
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post-insurrectionary income, if an insurrection occurs.5 However, Grossman
considers only events analogous to our ¯rst type of upheaval. Moreover,
he models families allocating their time between productive work, support
for the existing regime through paid soldiering, and activities to overthrow
the current regime. In our model, membership in a social group automat-
ically places one either for or against each of the two types of upheaval so
that our focus is on mobility between groups. Grossman (1994) extends his
work by replacing insurrectionary activity having a stochastic return, with
deterministic banditry by peasants against landlords. Landlords can give
land to peasants to divert their e®orts from banditry to farming. Such give-
aways are similar to, although more speci¯c than, our co-optation payments.
However, in our case, the goal is to decrease the probability and soften the
consequences of upheaval rather than to prevent banditry. Horowitz (1993)
has a dynamic model of land reform in which gifts of land to peasants make
them press for even more land. In this approach, there are only two groups
so that any transfers are given equally to all peasants and all con°icts are
resolved according to an exogenous probability distribution. In Acemoglu
and Robinson (2000), extension of a franchise can be seen as a sort of co-
optation policy to avoid upheaval, since franchise extension implies redis-
tributive transfers. However, franchise extension, when granted, involves
the entire threatening group. In our paper, the co-optation strategy implies
the creation of a new, privileged group that separates itself from its group of
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origin. Thus, their paper studies policies that treat an entire class uniformly
while we consider asymmetric treatment of a co-opted group and a non-co-
opted one. Biais and Perotti (1998) model a privatization process in which
the government underprices assets with the goal of getting the median voter
to oppose redistribution. Their concerns are similar to ours but they study
democratic societies with majority-rules voting. Wintrobe (1998) presents
a general theory of dictatorships that hold power through a combination of
repression and loyalty, a concept that functions similarly to what we call
co-optation. Gershenson and Grossman (2001) analyze the changing mix of
co-optation and repression that the Soviet elite used to hold power mainly
in response to exogenously changing international threats.6
Our work di®ers from all of the above papers in two important respects.
First, we derive the comparative static result that societies with stronger
upheaval technologies co-opt more people with larger o®ers than societies
with weaker upheaval technologies. Second, we derive conditions for unequal
treatment of equals to emerge as an optimal solution to the elite's problem.
3 The Basic Model
Consider a society comprised of two groups. Group 1, of size ¹1, holds
political power and Group 2, of size ¹2 = 1 ¡ ¹1; threatens this power.
Individuals in the two groups have incomes y1 and y2 respectively.
Group 2 threatens to carry out an upheaval that would completely ex-
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propriate Group 1 and divide up the spoils that are not destroyed in the
process evenly among its members. In order to decrease the chances of an
upheaval, Group 1 co-opts some agents from Group 2 into a third group,
Group C, that is given a su±cient stake in the status quo so that it does
not support upheaval. Let ¹C denote the size of Group C and let ¹R =
(¹2 ¡ ¹C) denote the mass of individuals who remain in Group 2. This will
be determined endogenously in a manner to be speci¯ed shortly. We assume
that the probability of upheaval is determined by the number of people who
remain in Group 2 after co-optation has taken place according to the for-
mula ¹R
®; 0 < ® < 1, where the parameter ® is a measure of the strength
and organization of the non-co-opted individuals.7 In the event of upheaval
Groups 1 and C receive incomes of 0 while each member of Group 2 will
get (1¡±)(¹1y1+¹2y2)¹2 ´
(1¡±)Y
¹2
where 0 < ± < 1 represents the fraction of the
total wealth of the society that would be destroyed in an upheaval.8
Group 1 has strong redistributive powers and takes in taxes all of Group
2's income.9 Then Group 1 uses some of its resources to co-opt part of Group
2 into a new Group C by making a co-optation o®er, c, to a mass, ¹C , of
members of Group 2. Any individual who accepts a co-optation o®er forfeits
his right to bene¯t from a successful upheaval, i.e., he gives up an option on
income (1¡±)Y¹2 to be collected with probability ¹R
®.10 On the other hand,
the co-optation transfer will only be consumed only by the individual to
whom it is o®ered in the event that upheaval does not occur. Therefore, the
12
minimal acceptable co-optation o®er must satisfy the following incentive
compatibility constraint:
¹R
® (1¡ ±)Y
¹R
· (1¡ ¹R®)c: (1)
Recognizing that Group 1 will never o®er more money than is necessary,
inequality (1) will be satis¯ed with equality. Consequently, the co-optation
payment as a function of the number of agents co-opted is:11
c (¹C) =
¹®¡1R (1¡ ±)Y
1¡ ¹®R
: (2)
The problem for Group 1 is to maximize its expected income by decid-
ing how many people to co-opt, given that it must respect the incentive
compatibility constraint. In other words, Group 1 solves the problem:
max0·¹C·¹2(1¡ ¹R®)
Y ¡ ¹Cc(¹C)
¹1
: (3)
For ® + ± > 1; i.e., if the revolutionary technology is not too strong, there
is an interior solution given by:
¹¤C =
®+ ± ¡ 1
®±
¹2 , (4)
which implies that the co-optation payment will be:
c¤ =
h
¹2
(1¡®)(1¡±)
®±
i®¡1
(1¡ ±)Y
1¡
h
¹2
(1¡®)(1¡±)
®±
i® : (5)
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For ®+ ± · 1, a corner solution in which ¹¤C = 0 and c¤ = ¹
®¡1
2 (1¡±)Y
1¡¹®2 ,
i.e., no co-optation takes place, is optimal. Inspection and simple analysis
of equations (4) and (5) leads to the following proposition for an interior
solution.
Proposition 1. Suppose ®+ ± > 1, then a higher (lower) ± leads to a higher
(lower) number of people co-opted, ¹¤C , and a lower (higher) co-optation
payment, c¤. A higher (lower) ® also leads to higher (lower) ¹¤C and lower
(higher) c¤ . A lower (higher) ¹2 leads to a lower (higher) ¹¤C and a higher
(lower) c¤. ¹¤C does not depend on the initial distribution of income or on
its level, i.e., y1 and y2 or Y .
Increasing ± is interpreted as a worsening in the upheaval technology of,
since higher ± means that more resources would be wasted in the event of
upheaval. Hence, upheaval is less attractive to Group 2 members and the
cost of co-optation is decreased. Group 1 responds to this lower price by
co-opting more individuals.
Increasing ® is a worsening in the upheaval technology as well, since a
higher ® means a lower probability of an upheaval for any given ¹R < 1.
This type of worsening has the same qualitative e®ect as increasing ±, i.e.,
it leads Group 1 to co-opt more people at a lower price per person. Notice
that increasing ® does more than just shift the probability-of-upheaval curve
downwards; it also decreases its slope for every ¹R. So the bene¯t to Group 1
of co-opting additional individuals will now be lower because the probability
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of upheaval will be increasing more rapidly in ¹C . This e®ect will induce less
co-optation. Our result shows that the former e®ect dominates the latter
one with the ¯nal outcome involving more co-optation at a lower price.
These two results suggest that the countries that were the least stable,
i.e., those facing signi¯cant chances of reversals, would be expected to im-
plement privatization programs that gave large bene¯ts, i.e., a large c¤, to
a small group, i.e., ¹¤C . The next result in the proposition is intuitive but
should not to be taken for granted. A larger Group 1 means that co-optation
costs are shared among a larger number of individuals so one might expect
them to co-opt more individuals from Group 2. However, Group 2 will be
smaller in this case and the corresponding upheaval probability will also be
smaller. The weaker threat dominates and Group 1 co-opts fewer people.
The last result makes sense since it is only relative incomes in the three
groups after redistribution that matter. However, in Section 6, we give
extensions of the model that eliminate this homogeneity in income. Simple
calculations12 lead to the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Suppose ®+ ± > 1, then a larger (smaller) size of Group 1,
¹1, leads to a lower (higher) size of total co-optation transfers, ¹
¤
Cc
¤.
Therefore, variation in the initial structure of society has implications
for the size of total transfers. In particular, a society in which the group
in power is smaller leads to larger transfers. From Proposition 1, a smaller
15
Group 1 implies a smaller individual co-optation transfer but it also implies
a larger fraction of Group 2 being co-opted.
An interesting question is whether co-optation payments will be so large
that Group C ends up better o® than Group 1. Group 1 gets strictly more
income than Group C if and only if Y¹1+¹C > c
¤, which happens if and only
if:
1 >
·
¹1
³
(1¡¹1)(1¡®)(1¡±)
®±
´®¡1
+
³
(1¡¹1)(1¡®)(1¡±)
®±
´®¸
(1¡ ±)
1¡
³
(1¡¹1)(1¡®)(1¡±)
®±
´® : (6)
This condition will be satis¯ed for at least some sensible parameter values in
which an interior solution is guaranteed. For example, if ¹1 =
1
4 ; ± =
1
2 , and
® = 34 , the inequality is satis¯ed.
4 Fragmentation of Group 2 and Divide-and-Rule
Tactics
In the above analysis, each member of Group 2 is treated as insigni¯cant.
Each individual who is o®ered a co-optation payment decides whether or
not to accept it but his decision has no e®ect on the mass of Group C and,
hence, on other individuals' decisions. Thus, we have assumed implicitly
that sub-groups are unable to co-ordinate their actions and will call this the
full fragmentation case.
In contrast to the full fragmentation case, suppose that any sub-group
of Group 2 of any size is free to agree on a binding commitment to refuse
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co-optation as a group. The only restriction is that each member of the
sub-group must gain strictly from following the prescribed course of action
if every other member of the sub-group does so. We call this case the no
fragmentation case. Speci¯cally, the incentive compatibility constraint (1)
becomes:13
¹2
® (1¡ ±)Y
¹2
· (1¡ ¹R®)c (7)
and equation (2) becomes:
c1 (¹C) =
¹®¡12 (1¡ ±)Y
1¡ ¹®R
. (8)
Group 1's maximization problem is:
max0·¹C·¹2(1¡ ¹R®)
Y ¡ ¹C ¹
®¡1
2 (1¡±)Y
1¡¹®R
¹1
(9)
which can easily be shown to be convex. Therefore, it has no interior solu-
tion. The solution is
¹C = ¹2; when ¹
®
2 · ±
¹C = 0; when¹
®
2 ¸ ±
In the no fragmentation case, either full co-optation or no co-optation is
optimal depending on the strength of the upheaval technology. When the
technology is su±ciently strong, i.e., with a combination of low enough ± and
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high enough ®, there is no co-optation. The intuition is that good upheaval
technology means that co-optation is prohibitively expensive. One di®erent
result is that raising ¹1 (lowering ¹2) can now lead to more co-optation
rather than less. This happens if we begin from a position of no co-optation
and then decrease the size of Group 2 until we reach a point where the
upheaval threat is weak enough that Group 1 switches to full co-optation.
After this point, decreasing the size of Group 2 any further will decrease
the size of the co-opted group since everyone is getting co-opted from an
increasingly smaller group.
The contrast between the full-fragmentation and no-fragmentation cases
is interesting from the point of view of the Machiavellian quote that begins
the paper. In the latter case, Group 2 is completely united and each member
is treated equally. In the former case, Group 2 is completely disorganized
and ex ante equals are treated unequally ex post. In particular, Group 2
is split into two sub-groups with diametrically opposed objectives. In other
words, Group 1 will follow a divide-and-rule strategy when disorganization
among the opposition permits.
Next we de¯ne intermediate degrees of fragmentation. Suppose Group 2
is divided into N sub-groups which, for simplicity, we assume to be of equal
size. Only agents belonging to the same sub-group can agree on co-ordinated
rejections of co-optation o®ers. For example, the sub-groups might be ethnic
groups. Co-operative agreements are possible within a homogeneous ethnic
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sub-group but there is not enough trust to make agreements across sub-
groups. Of course, ethnicity is just one example of a characterization that
can divide one sub-group from another; others could be class and income.
Suppose that Group 1 co-opts equal numbers of agents from each sub-
group. In this formulation, the incentive compatibility constraint becomes:
µ
¹R +
¹C
N
¶® (1¡ ±)Y
¹R +
¹C
N
· (1¡ ¹R®)c; (10)
and equation (2) becomes:
cN (¹C) =
¡
¹R +
¹C
N
¢®¡1 (1¡ ±)Y
1¡ ¹®R
. (11)
Group 1's maximization problem is:
max0·¹C·¹2(1¡ ¹R®)
Y ¡ ¹C (¹R+
¹C
N )
®¡1
(1¡±)Y
1¡¹®
R
¹1
: (12)
The ¯rst derivative of the maximand with respect to ¹C is:
®¹®¡1R ¡ (1¡ ±)
"
¹C (1¡ ®)
µ
¹R +
¹C
N
¶®¡2 N ¡ 1
N
+
µ
¹R +
¹C
N
¶®¡1#
;
(13)
which does not yield a closed-form solution for ¹C . Simple inspection indi-
cates that the comparative static result for ± is still true. Better upheaval
technology in the form of a lower ± will not increase the number of co-opted
agents.
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Instead of assuming that Group 1 co-opts equal numbers from each sub-
group allow Group 1 an unconstrained choice over the distribution of sub-
groups. Then, for any given number of co-opted individuals, ¹C , it is optimal
for Group 1 to select equal numbers from each sub-group. To understand the
intuition of this result note that a co-optation payment must be robust to
attacks from each sub-group. In particular, it must be large enough so that
the largest co-opted sub-group, i.e., the biggest threat, will not bene¯t from
rejecting co-optation together. Therefore, to minimize the cost of co-opting
¹C , Group 1 must make the largest co-opted sub-group as small as possible
by creating co-opted sub-groups of equal size. Thus, another dimension
of the divide-and-rule strategy appears as Group 1 deliberately creates a
co-opted class that is as divided as possible.
5 Two Types of Upheaval
We now consider a second type of upheaval led by Group C. Despite the fact
that its members have all been co-opted, Group C might still pose a threat
to Group 1. Suppose that Group 1 as an elite group and Group 2 is a lower,
disadvantaged class while Group C is an emergent middle class. In Section 2,
Group C was co-opted by Group 1, which opposes an expropriative upheaval.
At the same time, Group C did not acquire all the privileges of Group 1,
which kept control of society's redistributive policies. In many societies, the
middle class presents the most plausible threat to an elite group because,
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despite the fact that they do not pursue expropriation, they do aim at
increasing their power and wealth. We capture these ideas by introducing
a second type of upheaval that would merge Groups 1 and C, i.e., the old
elite and the new emerging class. Speci¯cally, if an upheaval of type 2 takes
place, each member of Group 1 and Group C will receive Y¹1+¹C while Group
2 will get 0 which is, once again, a normalization. In this formulation, Group
C is pursuing an equalitarian redistribution of income and control between
Group 1 and C. Indeed, one can view the equalized payo® associated with a
type 2 upheaval as the outcome of a deeper reform process that has allowed
Group C to determine, jointly with Group 1, society's redistribution policies.
Therefore, type 2 upheaval can be viewed as a democratization process.
Finally, notice that no destruction is associated with type 2 upheavals.
As before, upheavals of type 1 lead to 0 income for Groups 1 and C
and income per member for Group 2 of (1¡±)Y¹2 . Type 2 upheavals make
sense only if Group 1 is richer than Group C, i.e., if equation (6) is satis¯ed.
Otherwise, there would be no incentive for Group C to support this new
upheaval, which has the e®ect of merging the two groups. It does not make
sense for both types of upheavals to occur simultaneously. Therefore, as
before, we assume that the probability of an upheaval of type 1 is ¹®R while
the probability of a type 2 upheaval is [1¡ ¹®R]¹¯C where 0 < ¯ < 1. This
means that the probability of a type 2 upheaval, given that a type 1 upheaval
does not occur, is an increasing function of the number of people in Group
21
C.
Adding type 2 upheavals to the model yields two e®ects. First, it is now
easier to co-opt people because, although accepting a co-optation o®er still
forces people to give up their option to bene¯t from a type 1 upheaval, they
may bene¯t from type 2 upheavals. This lowers the price of co-optation
making Group 1 inclined to make more o®ers. Second, the bene¯t to Group
1 of co-opting people is now lower because Group C poses a new threat,
namely the threat of a type 2 upheaval. Of course, this makes Group 1
inclined to make fewer o®ers. In our formulation, the two e®ects cancel out
and exactly the same number of people are co-opted.
In the generalized model, the co-optation o®er, c^, must satisfy:
¹®R
(1¡ ±)Y
¹R
= (1¡ ¹®R)
"
¹¯CY
¹1 + ¹C
+
³
1¡ ¹¯C
´
c^
#
; (14)
which implies that:
c^ (¹C) =
¹®¡1R (1¡ ±)Y
(1¡ ¹®R)
³
1¡ ¹¯C
´ ¡ Y ¹¯C
(¹1 + ¹C)
³
1¡ ¹¯C
´ . (15)
Group 1 solves:
max0·¹C·¹2(1¡ ¹R®)[(
Y ¡ ¹Cc(¹C)
¹1
)(1¡ ¹¯C) + ¹¯C
Y
¹1 + ¹C
] . (16)
The fraction of people co-opted is the same as before, i.e.,
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¹^¤C=
®+ ± ¡ 1
®±
¹2 (17)
if ®+ ± > 1. The co-optation o®er is now:
c^¤=
Y
1¡ (®+±¡1®± ¹2)¯
f¹2[
(1¡®)(1¡±)
®± ]
®¡1 (1¡ ±)h
1¡
³
¹2
(1¡®)(1¡±)
®±
´®i ¡ (®+±¡1®± ¹2)¯h
1¡ ¹2 (1¡®)(1¡±)®±
i h
1¡ (¹2 ®+±¡1®± )
¯
ig .
(18)
Many of the comparative statics results from the basic model hold in
this expanded version. In particular, a higher ± or a higher ® lead to a
higher number of people co-opted, ¹^¤C ;and a lower co-optation payment, c^¤.
Furthermore, a higher ¹1 leads to a lower ¹^
¤
C and a higher c^
¤. Moreover,
while the number of people co-opted is the same under the two alternative
versions, the probability that there will be an upheaval, ¹^¤®R +(1¡ ¹^¤®R ) ¹^¤¯C ;
is greater with two types of upheaval than that with one type, ¹¤®R . Finally,
and with two types of upheaval rather than one, c^¤< c¤, i.e., the co-optation
payment is lower. This result follows because, for two types of upheavals
to be considered, Group C must earn less than Group 1 did with only one
type of upheaval. With two upheaval types, the o®er c¤ made to ¹^¤C =
¹¤C individuals is beyond the necessary threshold for acceptance because
individuals accepting it would receive something extra that they do not get
in the model with only one type, speci¯cally, the chance to bene¯t from the
second type of upheaval. When Group C does contemplate upheaval, Group
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1 gives lower transfers than would be the case without this threat. Finally,
we can establish that ¹¤Cc
¤ > ¹^¤C c^
¤ : In other words, a society with a more
demanding Group C ends up with smaller total transfers. A large transfer
program may be viewed as a way to keep the middle class happier and more
loyal.
6 Stabilizing Growth
The upheaval probability has been assumed to be a function only of the rel-
ative size of Group 2. However, a simple extension captures the notion that
wealthier societies tend to be more stable. Indeed, very wealthy societies face
extremely small chances of radical upheavals. Alesina et al. (1996) provide
evidence that low economic growth increases the likelihood of government
turnover, particularly in cases of dramatic changes in regime similar to the
ones we consider. Suppose that the parameter ® depends positively on Y ,
i.e., ®0 (Y ) > 0. As a society becomes richer, it gets increasingly di±cult
for any ¯xed fraction of the population to overthrow completely the existing
order. Presumably a wealthy Group 1 would be willing to commit a large
fraction of its wealth to defend against upheaval. In this case, the solution
is of the form:
¹¤C (Y ) =
® (Y ) + ± ¡ 1
® (Y ) ±
¹2 , (19)
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with the size of Group C increasing in Y . This implies that economic growth
would cause political stabilization in that the probability of an upheaval is
decreasing in income. Of course, the extension would work also for the
generalized model with two types of upheavals of Section 5. As in the basic
model with one type of upheaval, growth would cause political stabilization
in the sense that the probability of the worst kind of upheaval would be
decreasing in income.
Another less obvious extension that produces a similar result involves
introducing utility functions. Suppose that all agents have the same Cobb-
Douglas utility function U (w) = wµ where w denotes consumption, or
wealth, and 0 < µ < 1 is a ¯xed parameter. Equation (2) becomes
c (¹C) =
"
¹®R
1¡ ¹®R
# 1
µ (1¡ ±)Y
¹R
. (20)
Group 1 solves:
max0·¹C·¹2(1¡ ¹R®)
·
Y ¡ ¹Cc(¹C)
¹1
¸µ
. (21)
Since we are interested in how the solution to (21) responds to changes
in Y , suppose that Y changes to ¸Y for some ¸ > 0. Note that c (¹C)
will change to ¸c (¹C) so the maximand in (21) will be multiplied by ¸
µ.
Therefore, the solution to (21) does not vary with Y . However, with the
following reasonable modi¯cation, the solution to (21) will be increasing in
Y , i.e., the richer is Group 1 the more people it will co-opt. Suppose that,
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in the event of upheaval, the utility of Group 1 is not fully expropriated so
that its members receive some minimum positive utility. For example, some
wealth might be hidden in Swiss bank accounts. In this case, (21) becomes:
max0·¹C·¹2(1¡ ¹R®)
·
Y ¡ ¹Cc(¹C)
¹1
¸µ
+ ¹R
®Umin . (22)
The ¯rst order condition for (22) is:
F 0 (¹C : Y ) +G0 (¹C) = 0 (23)
where F 0 (¹C) is the derivative of the ¯rst term of (22) and G0 (¹C) is the
derivative of the second term (¹R
®Umin). Since G
0 (¹C) < 0, it must be the
case that F 0 (¹C) > 0. Moreover, F 0 (¹C) is homogeneous of degree µ in Y
while G0 (¹C) does not depend on Y . Therefore, if (23) is satis¯ed at a par-
ticular combination (Y; ¹C), it will be positive for any combination
³
Y
0
; ¹C
´
where Y 0 > Y . We conclude that the optimal ¹C is indeed increasing in Y .
Within a similar framework, it would be possible to consider the impact
of the relative wealth of Group 2. In a country that is still lacking a repre-
sentative democracy, the relative wealth of a restricted oligarchy may turn
out to be even more important than its mere size. If we assume that the
upheaval probability is an increasing function of wealth distribution, i.e.,
that a wealthier Group 2 does represent a more serious threat, this results
in a relatively small but well paid Group C.
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7 A Note on Extensive vs. Intensive Margins
Throughout the paper, we have considered agents as either fully co-opted or
as totally unco-opted. We now allow for all the possibilities of hybrid cases
in which the probability of a successful upheaval will depend not only on the
number of people who support upheaval but also on the total commitment
to upheaval of both full and partial supporters. Let each member of Group
2 have one unit of time to be allocated between work and upheaval activity.
Work pays only for agents who have received co-optation o®ers and c is paid
per unit of work. The probability of a successful upheaval is now º® where
º is the average quantity of time that members of Group 2 have allocated
to upheaval. In the event of a successful upheaval, the spoils are divided in
proportion to the contribution of each individual.
The maximization problem for any agent who has received a co-optation
o®er is:
max0·e·1e
º® (1¡ ±)Y
º
+ (1¡ e) c: (24)
This problem is linear in e so that either e = 0 or e = 1 or there is indi®er-
ence among all possible choices. Consider all possible degrees of fragmen-
tation and their associated equilibria from Section 4. Except for the full
fragmentation case, agents will have a strict preference for co-optation over
retaining an option to bene¯t from upheaval. In the full fragmentation case,
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agents will be indi®erent over all possible actions, including full co-optation.
Hence, all of these equilibria are robust to allowing intermediate levels of
co-optation.
Another way to look at this result is in terms of extensive and intensive
margins. Under what circumstances is it better for Group 1 to work the
extensive margin by co-opting a larger number of people and when is it
better to work the intensive margin by improving the level of co-optation
of those people who are already partial supporters? The general answer is
that, to the extent that Group 1 co-opts anyone, it should do so as well
as possible. In other words, everyone who is co-opted is always fully co-
opted so that the only active margin is the extensive one. At equilibrium,
any decrease in the co-optation o®er will cause the whole arrangement to
unravel.
8 Conclusion
The main conclusion from this analysis is that governments with a weak
hold on power are the ones most inclined to make large gestures to widen
even slightly their support base. This idea is roughly consistent with the
actual practice of post-Communist privatization. The Russian government
(Group 1), facing the opposition of industrial ministries, managers, work-
ers and regional and local governments (Group 2), which held formidable
power, handed over huge amounts of wealth to a very narrow section of the
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society that, in turn, supported Boris Yeltsin's reelection. On the other
hand, Poland and Hungary, where even the successors to the local Commu-
nist parties are very pro-market, have spread privatization bene¯ts much
more widely. Although the Russian process was highly corrupt and is likely
to have a poisoned legacy, it was arguably the only feasible way to proceed
(Shleifer and Triesman (2000)).
Our analysis develops strategies for holding power such as divide and
conquer and unequal treatment of equals. We also provide a new theory
of growth as a politically stabilizing force. However, there is a wide range
of important issues in this area that deserve further attention, such as the
optimal mix of punishments and rewards and why some upheavals are much
more violent than others.
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2. In no way do we wish to imply that the co-opted group is poorer than the
group doing the co-opting. The Russian privatization case highlights
this point since it was essentially an arrangement among di®erent elite
groups with reformers co-opting industrial and agricultural ministries
and managers.
3. The introduction of the welfare state in Bismarck's Prussia can also
be viewed as a response to the mobilization of the working class, in
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an e®ort to undercut more radical demands by co-opting it into the
prevailing political order.
4. Some would argue that the overthrow of Communism in Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union was more like this second type of upheaval than
the ¯rst.
5. On the technology of con°ict, see Hirshleifer (1991), Skaperdas (1992)
and Gar¯nkel and Skaperdas (1996).
6. More distantly related works are the following. Roemer (1985) presents
a game between two agents, Lenin and the Tsar, in which the proba-
bilities of a revolution are determined endogenously by political strate-
gies. In this paper, the threat of retribution against participants in
a revolution that fails is the Tsar's tool for holding power, rather
than co-optation of potential opposition. Robinson (1997) assumes
that development makes revolution more lucrative for a disadvantaged
group, possibly leading the elite group to democratize so as to fore-
stall this outcome. The elite's strategy is to refrain from investing in
public goods rather than co-optation. In Overland, Simons and Spa-
gat (2000), an elite uses rapid growth as a tool to maintain power. In
Spagat (1999), repression is the mechanism of control.
7. In Section 6, we discuss how the relative wealth of the members of Group
2 could be incorporated into the formula describing the upheaval prob-
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ability.
8. The income of 0 for Groups 1 and C in the event of an upheaval is
just a normalization. These groups might have some resources that
are completely out of the reach of Group 2 and would retain them
whether or not there is an upheaval.
9. Again this is a normalization, i.e., Group 1 actually takes that part of
Group 2's income that the latter group cannot shield.
10. One way to think of this assumption is that anyone who accepts a
co-optation o®er can be identi¯ed. Those who did not bene¯t from
such o®ers are then unwilling to help those who did after an upheaval.
11. More formally, consider a game in which there is a continuum of players
of mass ¹C , each with two strategies accept or reject the co-optation
o®er c (¹C). For a con¯guration of strategies in whichma is the mass of
those who accept andmr is the mass of those who reject, the payo®s are
[1¡ (¹1 ¡ma)®] c (¹C) for those who accept and (¹1 ¡ma)® (1¡±)Y(¹1¡ma)
for those who reject. There are two Nash equilibria of this game.
In one equilibrium everyone accepts the o®er, i.e., ma = ¹c, which
by (1) and (2) is optimal for each player as long as everyone else is
accepting. In the other equilibrium, everyone rejects the o®er. We
assume that Group 1 has the ability to co-ordinate agents so that the
¯rst equilibrium applies and we focus our attention on this one.
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12. Combining equations (4) and (5), we obtain ¹¤Cc¤ =
(®+±¡1)
£
¹2
(1¡±)
®±
¤
(1¡®)®¡1Y
1¡
£
¹2
(1¡®)(1¡±)
®±
¤® ;
which can be di®erentiated with respect to ¹2 = 1¡ ¹1:
13. Note that we need only to consider deviations from the previous equi-
librium in which all agents who are o®ered co-optation payments co-
ordinate their rejections because, if the o®ers are robust to this maxi-
mal deviation, they will withstand smaller challenges.
37
